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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Markets are typically comprised of various consumer segments. For instance, there are settings
where consumers are individual entities and thus each consumer represents a segment. In other
settings, individuals have some unifying characteristics, such as mother tongue, and therefore can
be grouped into distinct consumer segments. Other types of consumer segmentation are based on
gender, geographical location, marital status, sexual orientation, etc. When markets are segmented,
ﬁrms can typically decide to address one or more consumer segments as well as the entire market
by choosing their advertising strategies appropriately. From the point of view of the ﬁrms, the
question that arises is how they should market their products optimally.
As an example, consider consumer segmentation based on mother tongue. This type of segmentation
is relevant in those countries with several oﬃcial languages such as Belgium, Spain, Switzerland,
etc. and is becoming important in other countries such as the US where the Spanish speaking
community is sizeable. A ﬁrm operating, say, in the Belgium market may decide to enter only the
French-speaking community and do so by inserting commercials in TV channels that broadcast
only in French, or by inserting ads in newspapers and magazines written in French. Likewise,
the ﬁrm may decide to address only the Dutch-speaking community and proceed by targeting its
advertisements on these customers. Finally, the ﬁrm may want to address all the customers in
the market rather than just one of the consumer segments. In this paper we develop a theory of
competition in markets where ﬁrms can decide about the target of their advertising strategy.
We examine a simultaneous move game of pricing and advertising between ﬁrms selling a homoge-
neous product in a market consisting of various consumer segments.1 Consumers in all segments
are initially uninformed about the ﬁrms’ oﬀerings and their prices and thus the ﬁrms’ advertising
decision represents the decision to target product and price information on them. In this setting,
we explore the scope of the idea that market segmentation mitigates ﬁrm competitiveness. Even
though segmentation has nothing to do with product diﬀerentiation here and thus consumers always
buy from the lowest-price supplier, we show that it is suﬃcient to relax market competitiveness for
some parameters.
1The assumption that products are homogeneous enables us to isolate the eﬀects of segmentation. That is, in our
setting consumers diﬀer in attributes that are preference irrelevant.
2The basic features of the strategic game we study are that the population of consumers is segmented
into various consumer groups and that ﬁrms advertising strategies can be designed to reach the
distinct consumer segments and thus also the entire market. In the simplest version of our model
consumers are ‘perfectly’ segmented into two groups A and B of possibly diﬀerent size. Perfect
segmentation refers to the situation where a consumer can only belong to a single segment, like in
the case of segmentation based on gender. Firms may decide to target their ads on segment A at a
cost φA and charge a price pA, or to target their ads on segment B at a cost φB and charge a price
pB, or to advertise a price p to all the consumers in the market at a cost φA +φB. The advertising
costs should be seen as the cost of targeting product and price information on the diﬀerent markets.
In this model, we show that segmentation enables ﬁrms to make money in situations where they
would only break even in its absence; this illustrates the idea that segmentation may relax market
competitiveness. The reason is as follows: in the absence of segmentation, ﬁrms cannot be active in
the market with probability one and thus they make zero proﬁts. By contrast, when the market is
segmented there exist parameters for which ﬁrms are always active in the market, yet the probability
that they compete for the same consumers is relatively low.
In addition, our results characterize the nature of price-advertising equilibria in segmented ho-
mogeneous product markets. A natural way for ﬁrms to market products would be splitting the
market so that each ﬁrm serves one of the segments. We show, however, that an equilibrium in
pure strategies does not exist which implies that such segmentation equilibrium is not strategically
viable. In equilibrium, ﬁrms randomize in pricing as well as in advertising strategy. In particular,
ﬁrms randomize between targeting their ads on segment A, targeting their ads on segment B, and
advertising to the entire market. Thus, the market outcome can exhibit segmentation but not with
probability one. Further, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms enter the most proﬁtable segment more often than the
least proﬁtable one. Furthermore, ﬁrms price very aggressively when they go for the most proﬁtable
segment, quite gently when they target their ads on the least proﬁtable segment and moderately
aggressive when they advertise in the entire market. This random pricing and advertising strategy
leads to positive proﬁts provided that segments diﬀer suﬃciently either in size or in advertising
cost. When the proﬁtability of the distinct segments is similar instead, ﬁrms stay out of the market
with positive probability and thus obtain zero proﬁts in equilibrium.
3We now turn to discuss how parameter changes aﬀect equilibrium outcomes. We focus on the
positive-proﬁts equilibrium described above.2 We start by examining the implications of an increase
in advertising costs. We ﬁnd that an increase in advertising fees makes it more likely that the
market outcome exhibits segmentation: ﬁrms increase the probability with which they target their
ads on the distinct consumer segments and decrease the probability with which they advertise
in the entire market. Interestingly, this results in an increase in proﬁts when the advertising
cost is low initially, and in a fall in proﬁts otherwise. The intuition behind this non-monotonic
relationship between proﬁts and advertising costs is as follows. An increase in the cost of advertising
makes competition for the entire market a relatively unattractive strategy compared to competition
for the segments. Since a ﬁrm must be indiﬀerent between all three advertising strategies in
equilibrium, ﬁrms decrease the frequency with which they compete for the entire market. This
weakens competitiveness and results in an increase in revenues. When advertising costs are low
initially, this revenue eﬀect outweighs the cost eﬀect and ﬁrms’ proﬁts rise.3 Finally, we observe that
as advertising costs go to zero, the likelihood of segmentation converges to zero, the equilibrium
distribution of prices charged in the entire market converges to a price distribution that is degenerate
at the marginal cost and ﬁrms proﬁts converge to zero. This is reminiscent of the Bertrand paradox.
We next study how an increase in the diﬀerence between advertising cost across segments inﬂuences
the equilibrium. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms proﬁts are non-monotonic in this diﬀerence for some parameters.
When the cost diﬀerence rises, ﬁrms increase the probability with which they target their ads on
the most proﬁt a b l es e g m e n t ,a n dd e c r e a s et h ep r o b a b i l i t yw i t hw h i c ht h e yg of o rt h ee n t i r em a r k e t .
This increases the likelihood of market segmentation. For large cost asymmetries, an increase in
costs diﬀerences makes it very unattractive to advertise in the most expensive segment and ﬁrms
end up competing very aggressively for just one of the consumer segments, which results in lower
proﬁts. If advertising costs asymmetries are small initially, ﬁrms beneﬁt from an increase in fees
diﬀerences because they compete for the entire market less often.
We examine a couple of extensions of the basic model. First we look at the implications of ‘imperfect’
consumer segmentation. To do this, we study a market where segments A and B overlap, that
2We note that the comparative statics results for the zero-proﬁts equilibrium yield similar insights.
3The anti-competitive eﬀects of increasing advertising costs have also been pointed out by Stahl (1994) in a model
of (non-targeted) advertising. The mechanism here is diﬀerent because ﬁrms enter the market with probability one.
4is, some consumers belong to both segments. In the example of segmentation based on mother
tongue, this set comprises those consumers who are bilingual. We show that the equilibrium of the
benchmark model discussed above survives this change but we ﬁnd that imperfect segmentation
reduces the set of parameters for which this equilibrium exists. What is more interesting is that
ﬁrms may beneﬁt as segmentation becomes more imperfect. Indeed, we ﬁnd that when the market is
imperfectly segmented, other equilibria with positive proﬁts can be sustained. In a second extension
of the basic model, we allow for entry of ﬁrms. We show that in the pricing and advertising
equilibrium described above proﬁts decline as the number of ﬁrms in the market rises.
T h el a s ti s s u ew ed i s c u s si sw h a th a p p e n si fﬁrms can simultaneously advertise a price to segment
A’s consumers and a diﬀerent price to segment B’s consumers. Even though there is no consumer
heterogeneity in our model, a ﬁrm has incentives to price discriminate in our model to strengthen
its undercutting power. As a result, we ﬁnd that price discrimination erodes all possibilities to
obtain economic proﬁts. This result provides another instance where competing ﬁrms beneﬁt from
bans on price discrimination.4
Our paper should be seen as a contribution to the study of advertising in oligopolistic industries.
The novelty of our approach is that we examine the strategic use of targeted advertising in ho-
mogeneous product markets. The literature on informative advertising has in general ignored the
possibility that ﬁrms can choose to target their oﬀe r so nd i s t i n c tc o n s u m e rg r o u p s . 5 An exception is
the monopoly model of Esteban et al. (2001), who show that a ﬁrm use of specialized magazines as
a vehicle to target price advertisements on the consumers who value the good more leads to higher
advertised prices. The only papers we know where oligopolistic ﬁrms can choose to target their ads
on distinct buyer groups are Iyer et al. (2002) and Roy (2000). The ﬁrst paper examines a model
where products are diﬀerentiated. Some consumers are loyal to one ﬁrm, some other consumers are
loyal to the other ﬁrm and the rest of the consumers are price-sensitive. Seen from the viewpoint
of our work, loyalty gives ﬁrms reasons other than strategic to employ targeted advertising. Roy
4The literature on price discrimination and imperfect competition is surveyed in Stole (2003). Holmes (1989) is
an example where ﬁrms obtain higher proﬁts if price discrimination is not allowed. Armstrong and Vickers (2001)
show that this result is reversed if markets are suﬃciently competitive. Thisse and Vives (1988) analyze a spatial
model where ﬁrms proﬁts are lower under location-based pricing than under uniform pricing.
5See e.g. Bester and Petrakis (1995), Butters (1977), Grossman and Shapiro (1984), Stahl (1994), and Stegeman
(1991).
5(2000) studies a two-stage model where ﬁrms ﬁrst send product-advertisements to the consumers
and then choose their prices. Advertising has a long-run nature and a commitment to not invade
the ‘natural’ market of the rival enables ﬁrms to segment the market and appropriate consumer
surplus. His model applies to markets where advertising provides product information —and not
price information—, perhaps intended to create brand image and consumer awareness, and, later,
buyers discover prices costlessly. By contrast, our paper is in line with the main bulk of the adver-
tising literature and examines ﬁrm competition in environments where advertising has a short-run
nature and conveys price information.
Our paper develops a theory of competition in markets that are segmented and where ﬁrms oﬀer
truly homogeneous products. The key point in our paper is that here segmentation is unrelated to
consumer preferences and this enables us to isolate its eﬀects on competition. We show that this
case of minimal segmentation is suﬃcient to mitigate ﬁrm competitiveness. In this sense, this paper
is complementary to the body of work that has examined competition in markets with customer
loyalty (see e.g. Rosenthal, 1980), and in truly product diﬀerentiated markets, either with respect
to vertical attributes (see e.g., Shaked and Sutton, 1982) or with respect to horizontal attributes
(see e.g., d’Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979). This work has produced the standard result
that product diﬀerentiation relaxes price competition between ﬁrms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model. Section
3 presents the equilibria, the comparative statics results and some extensions of the basic model.
Section 4 discusses price discrimination. Section 5 closes the paper with a review of the main
conclusions. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
We examine a simultaneous advertising and pricing game between homogeneous product sellers.
The crucial feature of the setting we study is that the consumer market is segmented. As discussed
in the Introduction, we assume here that ﬁrms market homogeneous products, which implies that
segmentation is based on utility-irrelevant attributes.6 Examples of such attributes include gender,
6This assumption, along with others that will appear later, implies that we focus on a case of extreme competition.
The main idea of this paper, namely, that targeted advertising help ﬁrms weaken competitiveness should however be
6mother tongue, marital status, cultural interest, sexual orientation, geographical location, level of
education, etc. On the demand side of the market, there is a set of consumers who hold downward
sloping demand functions D(p). For later reference, we deﬁne the revenue per consumer as R(p) and
assume that R0(p) > 0, for all p ∈ [0,p m], where pm =a r gm a x p R(p). Let R−1(·) be the inverse
of the revenue function. For our purposes, it will be enough to assume that consumers can be
grouped into two market segments A and B, with sizes µA and µB respectively, µj > 0,j= A,B.
We normalize the total number of consumers to 1; thus µA + µB =1 .7
On the supply side of the market there are N ≥ 2 ﬁrms. These ﬁrms produce the good at constant
returns to scale and we normalize the marginal cost of production to zero without loss of generality.
Consumers ignore, ap r i o r i , the existence and the price of the products so that ﬁrms must inform
them to be able to sell. A ﬁrm i may decide to address either the consumers in segment A,o r
in segment B, or in both segments A and B (i.e., the entire market), or, ﬁnally, stay out of the
market altogether.8 We shall represent this set of pure advertising-strategies as Ei = {O,A,B,M},
where O denotes the decision to stay out of the market and M indicates the decision to send ads
to all the consumers in the market. A ﬁrm i’s mixed advertising-strategy is then a probability
function over the set Ei. We will refer to λi
j as the probability with which a ﬁrm i s e n d si t sa d st o
market j ∈ Ei. We assume that ﬁrms face an advertising cost φj > 0 to address consumer segment
j,j = A,B.9 Clearly, a ﬁrm sending its ads to the entire market bears a total cost of φA+φB.10 To
make the problem interesting, we assume that φj <µ jR(pm), j = A,B, i.e., each segment is worth
at monopoly price. We will refer to the ratio φj/µj as the proﬁtability of segment j, j = A,B.
valid in other environments, for instance, where products are diﬀerentiated.
7This speciﬁcation implies that the market is perfectly segmented in the sense that if a consumer belongs to a
segment then he/she does not belong to the other segment. Segmentation based on gender is an example of perfect
segmentation. As argued in the Introduction, sometimes segmentation is imperfect, like segmentation based on mother
tongue. Geographical segmentation is also typically imperfect. For example, consider Rotterdam city as a market;
the city is divided by the Maas river into the north side and the south side but there are consumers who commute
for a number of reasons. In section 4 we show that our main results extend to imperfectly segmented markets.
8We are thus assuming not only that ﬁrms can target their ads on a segment as well as on the entire market but
also that they can choose which segment to address. If consumers are atomistic, or if segmentation is geographical,
this is straightforward to do. If segmentation is based on some other attributes such as mother tongue sellers can
easily address a group of buyers who speak a particular language by inserting ads in newspapers and magazines
written in that language, or by inserting commercials in TV channels that only broadcast in that language.
9We are thus assuming that if a ﬁrm targets its ads on a particular market, this ﬁrm reaches all consumers in that
market. This is certainly a simplifying assumption that enable us to solve the problem we are interested in. The fact
that information provision is assumed to be perfect contributes to make our model a case of extreme competition.
10The nature of our results does not change if there are economies or diseconomies of scale in advertising (see
footnote 14 below).
7We assume, without loss of generality, that φA/µA ≤ φB/µB; this implies that, from the point of
view of the ﬁrms, segment A is more attractive than segment B, ceteris paribus. This will have
interesting implications on the nature of the equilibrium advertising and pricing decisions.
For advertising decision j ∈ {A,B}, a ﬁrm i’s pricing-strategy is denoted by a distribution of
prices Fi
j(p).W h e nj = M, we consider two price scenarios. One, ﬁrms advertise a uniform price
in the entire market so ﬁrm i price is denoted Fi
M(p). Two, ﬁrms advertise diﬀerent prices in




denote the support of Fi
j(p) and let pi
j and pi
j denote the maximum and the minimum price in σi
j,
respectively. A ﬁrm i’s strategy is thus denoted by a collection of pairs si = {(λi
j,Fi
j(p))}j∈Ei.
Our interest lies on the existence and characterization of symmetric Nash equilibria.12 As y m -
metric Nash equilibrium is an advertising and pricing strategy proﬁle such that an individual ﬁrm
maximizes proﬁts taking as given the strategies of the other ﬁrms.
3A n a l y s i s
Our objective is to examine the inﬂuence of consumer segmentation and targeted advertising on the
functioning of the market. We shall show that segmentation can be exploited by the ﬁrms to soften
competition and that this has interesting implications on the nature of the market equilibrium. To
see this, we will ﬁrst examine the benchmark case of a market that is not segmented and show
that in the unique symmetric equilibrium of the pricing and advertising game described above
ﬁrms obtain proﬁts equal to zero. Then we will study a perfectly segmented market and show that
segmentation leads to a positive-proﬁts equilibrium provided that ﬁrms do not advertise diﬀerent
prices at the same time. These issues are better explained by considering a duopolistic model so we
will set N =2in what follows. Later in this Section we show that our main result extends easily
11Some remarks on the issue of price discrimination are necessary here. In some settings price discrimination is
certainly unfeasible. For instance, in line with the examples above, legal restraints typically imply that a ﬁrm cannot
discriminate between persons of diﬀerent sexual orientation, nor between men and women or between French-speaking
and Dutch-speaking people. Sometimes price discrimination is legal but yet impractical. For example, when a shop
has a single point-of-sale advertised prices must equal on-the-shop prices; in addition, it does not seem common
practice to charge consumers diﬀerent prices in the shop just because they have seen diﬀerent ads. However, there
may be contexts where price discrimination is feasible and practical and that is why, in Section 4, we explore the role
that price discrimination has in our model.
12We also examine all pure asymmetric entry-strategy proﬁl e s( s e eL e m m a1b e l o w ) .
8to a N-ﬁrm oligopoly game, as well as to the case of imperfect segmentation. In Section 4, we shall
consider the case of price discrimination.
Non-segmented markets:
As a benchmark case, we examine here a setting where ﬁrms are unable to target their ads on
the consumer segments, that is, they can either advertise to the entire market or not at all, i.e.,
Ei = {O,M}. The following result, due to Sharkey and Sibley (1993), shows that the advertising
and pricing game described above has a unique symmetric equilibrium in which ﬁrms obtain zero
proﬁts.
Theorem 1 In the unique symmetric equilibrium of the game ﬁrms stay out of the market with
probability λO =
φA+φB
R(pm) and enter the entire market with probability λM =1− λO in which case
they advertise a price p randomly chosen from the set σM =
£
R−1(φA + φB),p m¤
according to the






. This equilibrium exists always.
The proof is sketched in the Appendix. We note that ﬁrms cannot be active in the market with
probability one because competition would drive revenues down to zero. In equilibrium, ﬁrms must
randomize between staying out of the market and advertising in the entire market, which yields
zero-proﬁts.
Segmented markets:
To examine the implications of targeted advertising in the presence of consumer segmentation,
we analyze equilibria where ﬁrms can also decide to target their ads on a single segment, i.e.,
Ei = {O,A,B,M}. Our ﬁrst remark is that a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist in this game
either.
Lemma 1 A pure advertising-strategy cannot be part of an equilibrium.
We note that this result holds for symmetric as well as asymmetric pure strategies. Symmetric
advertising-strategies are readily ruled out by noting that an individual ﬁrm always has an incentive
to deviate, either by targeting its ads on non-served segments, or by exiting the market altogether.
A further elaboration of these arguments shows that asymmetric advertising-strategy proﬁles cannot
9be part of an equilibrium either. The economic implication of this result is that the market outcome
cannot exhibit ‘permanent’ segmentation in the sense that diﬀerent consumer groups are always
served by distinct ﬁrms.13 This contrasts with Roy (2000) and the diﬀerence in results stems from
the long-run nature of advertising in his model.
We are now ready to present our main result: if ﬁrms can target their ads on diﬀerent consumer
segments, then ﬁrms can obtain positive-proﬁts in equilibrium. We develop this result in two
steps. We ﬁrst examine the necessary conditions for a positive-proﬁts equilibrium to exist. We
then construct an equilibrium in which ﬁrms obtain positive proﬁts and examine the region of
parameters for which this equilibrium exists. Interestingly, positive proﬁts require the segments to
diﬀer suﬃc i e n t l ye i t h e ri ns i z eo ri na d v e r t i s i n gc o s t s .
Proposition 1 If a positive-proﬁts equilibrium exists, then (a) λj ∈ (0,1),j= A,B,M, and
λO =0 , (b) FA(p),F B(p) and FM(p) are atomless price distributions and (c) pA < pA = pM <
pB < pB = pM = pm.
The proof, which is in the Appendix, proceeds as follows. We ﬁrst prove that ﬁrms must advertise in
the entire market with strictly positive probability; otherwise a ﬁrm obtaining positive proﬁts would
gain by deviating and sending ads to the entire market. Then we note that ﬁrms must allocate
positive probability to targeting their ads on segment A as well as on segment B;o t h e r w i s e ,a
ﬁrm advertising in the entire market would gain by deviating and saving the cost of sending ads to
one of the segments. The interpretation of these two remarks is that a positive-proﬁts equilibrium
requires ﬁrms to introduce quite a bit of noise in regard to their advertising strategies. We then
show that there cannot be a single price common to all three equilibrium supports σA,σB and
σM in a positive-proﬁts equilibrium; otherwise a ﬁrm charging such price would not be indiﬀerent
between all three advertising strategies. The next step is to show that ﬁrm pricing behavior in every
market is characterized by atomless price distributions and this follows from simple undercutting
arguments. This tells us that only by obscuring the market suﬃciently, ﬁrms can hope to make
money in equilibrium. After this, a series of claims proves that the support conﬁguration must
satisfy the inequality above. These claims exploit two facts: ﬁrst, that a ﬁrm that advertises in a









B =1 cannot be part of an equilibrium, which is straightforward to verify.
10single segment cannot increase its proﬁts by deviating and entering the entire market; second, that
a ﬁrm that advertises in the entire market cannot increase its proﬁts by deviating and targeting its
ads on a single segment.
To illustrate, the support conﬁguration derived in Proposition 1,c) is depicted in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Conﬁguration of price supports in a positive-proﬁts equilibrium.
This Proposition shows that the maximum price ﬁrms charge when they target their ads on segment
A is strictly lower than the minimum price ﬁrms charge when they go for segment B. The reason for











We note that segment A is more attractive than segment B because advertising cost per consumer is
lower in the former than in the latter. In equilibrium, ﬁrms must be indiﬀerent between advertising
in segment A and advertising in segment B, which can only be possible if the expected revenue per
consumer in segment A i sl o w e rt h a ni ns e g m e n tB. O n ew a yt oa c c o m p l i s ht h i si st oa n n o u n c e
high prices in segment B and low prices in segment A.14
Our next result shows that there exists a unique symmetric positive-proﬁts equilibrium provided
that segment A’s advertising cost per consumer is low enough compared to segment B’s. To
characterize this equilibrium, we exploit the fact that a ﬁrm must be indiﬀerent between the distinct
pricing and advertising strategies described in Proposition 1.
14Expression (1) is also useful to understand how our results would be modiﬁed if there were economies or disec-
onomies of scale in advertising. In the presence of strong economies of scale, the entire market would be the most
proﬁtable market while in the presence of diseconomies of scale it would be the least proﬁtable market. The result
in Proposition 1 would then be modiﬁed according to the intuition presented above.
11Theorem 2 There exists a unique positive-proﬁts symmetric equilibrium which takes the following
form: With probability λA =
φB−φAµB
µ2
BR(pm)+φBµA ﬁrms target their ads on segment A and charge a




R(p) ; with probability λB = φA/µAR(pm) ﬁrms target their ads on segment B and







, and with the remaining probability ﬁrms advertise in the entire















for all p ∈ [pB,p m]
where pA = R−1((1 − λA)R(pA)),p B = R−1(R(pm)(λA − λB)/λA) and pA = pM = R−1(φB/µB).










and ﬁrms obtain a proﬁt Eπ = µBλAR(pm) −
φB > 0.
The proof is in the Appendix. An interesting feature of the equilibrium described in Theorem 2
is that ﬁrms advertise in segment A more frequently than in segment B. The reason for this is
again related to the inequality (1). Since ﬁrms must be indiﬀerent between advertising in either
of the segments, in addition to charging lower prices in segment A, ﬁrms compete for segment A’s
consumers more frequently than for segment B’s ones, which makes segment A less attractive in
turn. The question that arises is whether pricing is more or less aggressive when ﬁrms advertise in
the entire market. Our next result provides a response.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium distribution of prices FB(p) dominates FM(p) in a ﬁrst-order
stochastic sense; moreover, from Proposition 1 it follows that FM(p) dominates FA(p) under the
same criterion.
The proof is in the Appendix. Since FB(p) dominates FM(p) in a ﬁrst-order stochastic sense, this
implies that expected prices are highest when ﬁrms compete for segment B’s buyers, intermediate
when they compete for the entire market and lowest when they compete for segment A’s consumers.
The reason is that, ap r i o r i , entering the entire market is a more attractive strategy than entering
12segment B, but a less attractive strategy than entering segment A; this pricing behavior helps ﬁrms
make the distinct entry strategies equally attractive.
The equilibrium described in Theorem 2 is illustrated in Figure 2 below for a situation where the
two consumer segments are of equal size and D(p)=1up to the monopoly price pm =1 .I n
this graph we have represented the equilibrium distribution of prices advertised in segment A, in
segment B and in the entire market.










Figure 2: Equilibrium price distributions (φA =1 /20,φ B =2 /20).











. This condition can easily be represented in the space
of per-consumer advertising cost. In Figure 3, a positive-proﬁts equilibrium exists in the region
of parameters indicated with the label Eπ > 0. F o ra n yg i v e ns e g m e n tB’s advertising cost, the
condition requires segment A’s proﬁtability to be high enough. The reason is as follows. For a given
φB/µB, equilibrium proﬁts are equal to Eπ = µBλAR(pm) − φB, which depend on the probability
λA with which a ﬁrm does not compete for segment B’s consumers with the rival ﬁrm. For this
probability to be large enough so that revenues oﬀset the cost of advertising in segment B, the
proﬁtability of segment A must be suﬃciently high. When this is the case, as discussed above, the








Figure 3: Existence of a positive-proﬁt equilibrium.
The previous discussion motivates an examination of equilibria when parameters violate the con-










. Moreover, it can be seen that the strategies given in Theorem 2 would










because ﬁrms do not advertise in segment
A suﬃciently frequently. We now show that in this case there exists a symmetric equilibrium with
zero proﬁts whose characteristics are somewhat similar to those of the positive proﬁts equilibrium
of Theorem 2, except in that ﬁrms stay out of the market with strictly positive probability. In this
equilibrium, the conﬁguration of price supports is as in Figure 4.
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. Then there exists a zero-proﬁts symmetric equilibrium
which takes the following form: With probability λO =
φ2
BµA−µBR(pm)(φBµA−φAµB)
φBµBµAR(pm) ﬁrms stay out
of the market; with probability λA =
φBµA−φAµB
φBµA ﬁrms target their ads on segment A and charge




R(p)µA −(1−λA)); with probability λB = λA(1−φB/µBR(pm)) ﬁrms advertise in segment B








, a n dw i t ht h er e m a i n i n gp r o b a b i l i t yﬁrms advertise in the
entire market and charge a price p randomly chosen from the set σM = σB according to the price
distribution FM(p)=FB(p),w h e r epA = R−1(φA/µA), and pA = pM = pB = R−1(φB/µB).
This result should be seen as a natural extension of Theorem 2 to a situation where the per consumer
advertising cost of the two segments is large enough. As mentioned above, this equilibrium exists
precisely in the region of parameters where a positive proﬁts equilibrium fails to exist (region
labelled Eπ =0in Figure 3). We note that, for a given segment B’s advertising cost, an increase
in segment A’s advertising cost leads to an increase in the probability with which ﬁrms stay out
of the market. Theorems 2 and 3 together imply that an equilibrium always exists, either with
positive proﬁts or with zero-proﬁts.15
We now turn to ask how sensitive our equilibria in Theorems 2 and 3 are to parameter changes.
The comparative statics results of these two equilibria yield similar insights so we focus in what
follows on the positive-proﬁts equilibrium in Theorem 2. For this purpose, let us assume, without
loss of generality, that φA = γR(pm), with γ ∈ (0,µ A) and φB = βφA, with β ∈ [µB/µA,µ B/γ). We
note that an increase in both segments’ advertising fees is captured by an increase in γ (keeping
constant β) while an increase in the asymmetry across segments is captured either by an increase
in β or by an increase in µA.
Proposition 3 In the positive-proﬁts equilibrium described in Theorem 2 the following relations
hold:
(1) ∂λA
∂γ > 0, ∂λB
∂γ > 0, and ∂λM
∂γ < 0. Further, an increase in γ widens σA and σB, and narrows
σM. Furthermore, expected proﬁts are non-monotonic in γ, ﬁrst increasing and then decreas-
ing. Finally, as γ → 0,λ M → 1 and FM(p) converges to a price distribution that is degenerate
at the marginal cost.
15For the sake of completeness, we note that other zero-proﬁt symmetric equilibria exist. First, if φA/µA = φB/µB,
then there exist an equilibrium where λO+λM =1 ;we note that this equilibrium is the natural extension of Theorem
1 to the case of segmented markets but only exists if segments are equally attractive. Second, if φA/µA = φB/µB =
R(p
m)/2, then there exists an equilibium where λA + λB =1 . Third, if φA/µA >R (p
m) − φB/µB, then there exists
an equilibrium where λO + λA + λB =1 . Finally, for all parameters, there exists a continuum of equilibria where
λO + λA +λB + λM =1 ; this equilibrium diﬀers from that in Theorem 3 in that pA = pB = pM = p
m. The proofs of
these results are available from the authors upon request.
15(2) ∂λA
∂β > 0, ∂λB
∂β =0 , and ∂λM
∂β < 0.F u r t h e r ,a n i n c r e a s e i n β widens σA, and narrows both
σB and σM. Furthermore, expected proﬁts are increasing in β if β<2µB/µA; otherwise,
expected proﬁts are non-monotonic, ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing, provided that γ is
large enough.
(3) ∂λA
∂µB < 0, ∂λB
∂µB > 0, and ∂λM
∂µB is indeterminate. Further, an increase in µB narrows σA,a n d
widens both σB and σM.F u r t h e r m o r e ,e x p e c t e dp r o ﬁts are decreasing in µB if β<µ B(1 −
µA)/µ2
A; otherwise expected proﬁts are non-monotonic, ﬁrst decreasing and then increasing,
provided that γ is large enough.
Building on this Proposition, we ﬁrst ask how a decrease in advertising cost γ aﬀects the equilibrium.
A fall in advertising costs leads to an equilibrium where the market outcome exhibits segmentation
less likely and where pricing is less extreme. That is, ﬁrms decrease the probability with which they
advertise high prices in segment B, and also decrease the probability with which they advertise
low prices in segment A; by implication, ﬁrms increase the probability with which they advertise
intermediate prices in the entire market. In addition, ﬁrms narrow the set of prices they choose
from when they enter at the segment level, while they widen the set of prices they choose from
when they advertise in the entire market. Keeping everything else constant, what happens is that
a decrease in advertising costs makes advertising to all consumers a relatively inexpensive strategy
as compared to advertising in just a segment. For ﬁrms to remain indiﬀerent between the diﬀerent
advertising strategies, they must decrease competition for the distinct consumer segments and
increase competition for the entire market. This results in lower advertising probabilities and lower
price dispersion at the segment level, and greater price dispersion at the market level.16
How does an increase in advertising costs aﬀect ﬁrms’ proﬁts? We can show that proﬁts are non-
monotonic in advertising costs, ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing. We observe that by making
advertising in the entire market a less attractive strategy, competitiveness weakens and ﬁrm rev-
enues boost. When γ is low to begin with, gains from weaker competitiveness oﬀset the advertising
cost increase; by contrast, when advertising fees are high enough, the increase in revenues is too
16We are using here the term price dispersion to refer to the width of the support of a price distribution. This
is certainly an abuse of terminology. To be more precise, we have run numerical simulations and found that the
variances of the price distributions FA(p) and FB(p) both decrease as γ decreases; by contrast we have seen that the
variance of FAB(p) exhibits a non-monotonic relationship with respect to γ, ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing.
16small to outweigh the cost increase. The inﬂuence of γ on the equilibrium pricing behavior of
the ﬁrms can be seen in Figure 5. The left graph shows the equilibrium price distributions when
advertising costs are low while the right graph represents a market with high advertising costs. We
ﬁnally notice that as γ converges to zero, λM converges to 1, the equilibrium distribution of prices
converges to the degenerate price distribution at the marginal cost and proﬁts converge to zero.



















Figure 5a. Low entry cost (γ =1 /50;β =2 ) . Figure 5b. High entry cost (γ =1 /10; β =2 ) .
We now turn to discuss how an increase in the asymmetries across segments inﬂuences ﬁrm behavior
and performance. We start by considering an increase in the diﬀerence between the segment A’s
advertising cost and segment B’s. An increase in β captures an increase in the cost of targeting
ads on segment B, keeping constant the cost of advertising in segment A.T h u s ,ceteris paribus,a n
increase in β raises asymmetries across segments. This results in an increase in the probability with
which ﬁrms advertise in segment A, while the probability with which ﬁrms advertise in segment B
is unaltered; as a consequence ﬁrms advertise to all the consumers in the market less frequently.
The reason is that in equilibrium the three advertising strategies must be equally attractive, so
ﬁrms must increase competition for segment A’s consumers and decrease competition for segment
B’s. The supports of the equilibrium price distributions also change according to intuition (see
Figure 6 below). When ﬁrms compete more frequently for a segment in the market, they increase
price dispersion to mitigate rival’s successful price undercutting.17 Interestingly, these observations
translate into proﬁts being non-monotonic in β. The reason why proﬁts can increase stems from
17To be more precise, we note that numerical simulations reveal that the variances of FA(p) and FAB(p) exhibit a
non-monotonic relationship with respect to β, ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing, while the variance of FB(p) falls
in β.
17the weakening of competitiveness associated with the fact that ﬁrms compete for the entire market
less frequently.





















Figure 6a. Low β (γ =1 /20;β =1 .2). Figure 6b. High β (γ =1 /20; β =8 ) .
Finally, we discuss the implications of a change in the distribution of consumers across segments.
An increase in µA leads to an increase in the probability with which ﬁrms advertise in segment A
and to a decrease in the probability with which they advertise in segment B. This results in eﬀects
similar to those when β rises since this is another way to alter the relative proﬁtability of the two
segments. Proﬁts again may exhibit a non-monotonic pattern with respect to the parameter of
interest. The reason is as follows. Note that equilibrium proﬁts are Eπ = µBλAR(pm)−φB. From
this expression, it is clear that an increase in µA tends to decrease proﬁts, which can be seen as
a negative demand eﬀect. However, there is a competition eﬀect by which ﬁrms advertise more
frequently in segment A, which tends to increase proﬁts. We see that, for similar segment sizes,
the competition eﬀect is dominant and proﬁts increase as µA rises; by contrast, when the sizes of
the two segments are already quite diﬀerent, the demand eﬀect is stronger and proﬁts decrease.
So far we have proved that the use of targeted advertising in segmented markets enables ﬁrms to
make money in settings where they would only break even in the absence of it; this has been shown
for a situation in which segmentation is perfect and two ﬁrms operate in the industry. We now
investigate the role of these two assumptions.
183.1 Imperfect segmentation
In the market described above, consider now that segmentation is imperfect in the sense that the
two consumers segments overlap. This implies that some consumers belong to both segments,
i.e., there exists a subset of consumers in segment A (B) who are also in segment B (A).W ew i l l
denote the total number of consumers who belong to both segments as µAB.18 Therefore we assume
consumer distribution to satisfy µA + µB + µAB =1 , with µi > 0,i= A,B,AB. We note that,
provided that ﬁrms do not stay out of the market, the fraction of consumers µAB is always fully
informed about the prices charged by both ﬁrms. Moreover, we note that perfect segmentation
obtains as the limiting case µAB → 0.
We start investigating the robustness of the positive-proﬁts equilibrium in Theorem 2. The next






µB(µBR(pm)−φB)+φB(1−µA). Then, there exists a positive-proﬁts sym-
















ﬁrms target their ads on segment A consumers and charge a price p randomly chosen from the set
σA =[ pA,pA] according to the price distribution FA (p)=1− λB+λM
λA
R(pA)−R(p)
R(p) ; with probability
λB =
φA
µAR(pm) ﬁrms advertise a price p randomly chosen from the set σB =[ pB,p m] according to




R(p) in segment B; and with the remain-
ing probability ﬁrms go for the entire market and charge a price p randomly chosen from the set














for all p ∈ [pB,p m].
In equilibrium ﬁrms obtain proﬁts Eπ = λAµBR(pm) − φB > 0.
18More formally, consider that e µA consumers belong to segment A while e µB belong to segment B, with e µA+e µB =1 .
Let ρAe µA be the fraction of segment A consumers who are also part of segment B, with ρA ∈ (0,1); deﬁne similarly
ρBe µB. Then the total number of consumers who belong to both segments is µAB = ρAe µA + ρBe µB, while µA =
(1 − ρA)e µA and µB =( 1− ρB)e µB.
19The proof is in the Appendix. We now discuss the implications of imperfect segmentation on the
likelihood of the positive-proﬁts equilibrium described above. We note that the condition in Propo-
sition 4 (imperfect segmentation) converges to the condition in Theorem 2 (perfect segmentation)
as µAB → 0. These two conditions are represented in Figure 7 below; the thicker curve represents
the condition in Proposition 4 while the thinner curve shows that in Theorem 2. As the size of the
fraction of consumers who belong to both segments increases, then the thicker curve shifts down-
wards, which reduces the set of parameters for which a positive-proﬁts equilibrium exists. This can
be seen by comparing the left graph (µAB small) with the right one (µAB large). The reason for
this result is that these consumers increase market competitiveness; indeed, when µAB → 1, then
the region under the thicker curve vanishes and ﬁrms cannot make money in equilibrium employing
the strategy proﬁle given in the Theorem.19










Figure 7a. Low µAB (µAB =0 .15). Figure 7b. High µAB (µAB =0 .4).
We observe now that imperfect segmentation does not undermine the comparative statics results
provided above in the context of Theorem 2 (see Proposition 3). However, a new question arises
here: How does an increase in µAB aﬀect ﬁrm equilibrium behavior and performance? To answer
this question, we distinguish between the case in which an increase in µAB is accompanied by a
decrease in µA, and the case in which an increase in µAB comes with a decrease in µB.
19We have proved that there exists another positive-proﬁts equilibrium where ﬁrms randomize between advertising
low prices in segment A a n dh i g hp r i c e si ns e g m e n tB. This equilibrium exists in a diﬀerent region of parameters and,
interestingly, it covers the entire parameter space as µAB → 1. This implies that imperfect segmentation increases
the scope of targeted advertising as a device to soften competition. The proof is available from the authors upon
request.
20Proposition 5 In the positive-proﬁts equilibrium described above in Proposition 4 the following
relations hold:
(1) Holding µB constant, ∂λA
∂µAB =0 , ∂λB
∂µAB > 0, and ∂λM
∂µAB < 0; further, an increase in µAB widens
σB, while σA, σM and equilibrium proﬁts are not altered.
(2) Holding µA constant, ∂λA
∂µAB > 0, ∂λB
∂µAB =0 , and ∂λM
∂µAB < 0; further, an increase in µAB widens
σA and narrows σM; furthermore, if γ<(>)
µ2
B
β−µB(2−µB), then, an increase in µAB narrows
(widens) σB and increases (decreases) equilibrium proﬁt.
The proof is in the Appendix. We now elaborate on the intuition behind this result. When µAB
increases in such a way that µA+µAB is constant (part 1), it turns out that segment A remains an
equally attractive market (this can be seen by looking at the payoﬀ function (13) in the Appendix).
As a result λA does not change. However, segment B becomes a more attractive market; the
reason is that as µAB rises, the number of customers a ﬁrm that advertises in segment B may sell
to increases (see equation (14) in the proof). As a result λB increases and σB widens. Finally, an
increase in µAB makes advertising to all the consumers in the market a less attractive strategy (see
equation (15) below). As a result, competition for the entire market must occur less frequently so
λM falls to restore equilibrium. Interestingly, proﬁts are insensitive to changes in µAB in this case.
When µAB increases in such a way that µB + µAB is constant (part 2 of the Proposition), we note
that segment A becomes a more attractive market. The reason is that the number of customers a
ﬁrm may sell to when advertising in segment A rises (see payoﬀ function (13)). As a result ﬁrms
must increase competition for segment A buyers and σA correspondingly widens. By contrast, an
increase in µAB makes advertising in the entire market a less attractive strategy (see (15)) and
λM falls to restore the equilibrium. It turns out that equilibrium proﬁts may rise with increasing
µAB; the reason is that ﬁrms compete for the entire market less frequently and this reduces overall
market competitiveness.
3.2 N-ﬁrm oligopoly
T h e o r e m2c a nb ee x t e n d e dt oc o n s i d e ra no l i g o p o l i s t i cm a r k e tw i t hN ﬁrms. If all ﬁrms in the
market randomize between targeting their ads on segment A and charging prices from σA, sending
21ads to segment B and charging prices from σB, and advertising in the entire market and charging
prices from σM, where σA,σB and σM satisfy Proposition 1, the payoﬀ to a ﬁrm advertising p ∈ σA
in segment A is:





















If a ﬁrm advertises a price p from σB in segment B, this ﬁrm obtains a proﬁte q u a lt o :


















M (1 − FM(p))N−1−j−i
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− φB
If a ﬁrm advertises in the entire market, it may be the case that this ﬁrm charges a price p ∈ σM∩σB
or else p ∈ σM\σB. The proﬁts a ﬁrm obtains in those cases are:
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M (1 − FM(p))N−1−j−i
i
− φA − φB.
Using the binomial theorem, these proﬁt expressions can be simpliﬁed:
Eπi(λA =1 ,p∈ σA;s−i)=R(p)µA[1 − λA + λA(1 − FA(p)]N−1 − φA
Eπi(λB =1 ,p∈ σB;s−i)=R(p)µB[λA + λM(1 − FM(p)) + λB(1 − FB(p))]N−1 − φB
Eπi(λM =1 ,p∈ σM ∩ σB;s−i)=Eπ(λB =1 ,p∈ σB)+R(p)µA[λB + λM(1 − FM(p))]N−1 − φA − φB
Eπi(λM =1 ,p∈ σM\σB;s−i)=R(p)µA[λB + λM(1 − FM(p))]N−1
+R(p)µB[λA + λBλM(1 − FM(p))]N−1 − φA − φB.
A similar procedure as the one that underlies Theorem 2 enables us to ﬁnd a characterization of
equilibrium in this N-ﬁrm market. Our interest is on how entry of ﬁrms aﬀects equilibrium proﬁts.
22The proﬁts a ﬁrm obtains from advertising a price pM to all the consumers in the market must
be equal to the proﬁts this ﬁrm gets if it charges pm instead. This yields an expression for the





φB(1 − λA)N−1 − φB + φA =0 (2)
Unfortunately this expression cannot be solved for λA explicitly. However we note that equilibrium
proﬁts are given by
Eπ = R(pm)µBλN−1
A − φB
















µBφB(N − 1)(1 − λA)N−2 + λA ln[λA]
=
µA
µBφB(1 − λA)N−1 ln[1 − λA]+
µA




µBφB(1 − λA)N−2 < 0.
As a result:
Proposition 6 Consider an N-ﬁrms oligopoly advertising and pricing game where µA + µB =
1,µ j > 0,j = A,B. Assume ﬁrms strategies si = {(λi
j,Fi
j(p))}j∈Ei,i=1,...,N satisfy Proposition 1.
Then, a positive-proﬁts equilibrium exists and entry of ﬁr m sc a u s e se q u i l i b r i u mp r o ﬁts to fall.
4P r i c e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n
In Section 3, a ﬁrm deciding to send ads to all the consumers in the market did charge a single
price. As argued above (see footnote 11) this is a reasonable assumption in many settings. However,
there may be situations where ﬁrms ﬁnd it feasible to print advertisements with diﬀerent prices and
send them to distinct consumer segments at the same time. This motivates an examination of the
implications of allowing ﬁrms to price discriminate across segments. Compared to the benchmark
case of no segmentation, our next result shows that targeted advertising brings about diﬀerent
types of equilibria but all equilibria exhibit zero-proﬁts under price discrimination.
23Proposition 7 Let µA + µB =1 ,µ j > 0,j = A,B. Consider the advertising and pricing game
described above; if ﬁrms can practise price discrimination when advertising in the entire market,
then ﬁrms obtain zero-proﬁts in equilibrium. The following strategies constitute an equilibrium for
all parameters: ﬁrms stay out of the market with probability λO =
φA+φB
R(pm) and enter the entire
market with probability λM =1− λO in which case they charge segment j’s consumers a price p
randomly chosen from the set σj =
£
R−1(φj/µj),p m¤







,j= A,B. There are other zero-proﬁts equilibria: in particular, there exists
an equilibrium where λO+λA+λB =1and a continuum of equilibria where λO+λA+λB+λM =1 .
The proof, which is in the Appendix, proceeds as follows. We ﬁrst note that pure-strategy equilibria
do not exist; second, we show that whenever strategies prescribe a ﬁrm to advertise a price pA in
segment A and a price pB in segment B, then such a ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable to deviate by advertising
ap a i ro fp r i c e s( pA,p B) in the entire market. The fact that a ﬁr mc a nd e v i a t ea n dc h a r g ed i s t i n c t
prices in diﬀerent consumer segments is what distinguishes this result from that in Theorem 2.
This result constitutes another instance showing that ﬁrms may beneﬁt from bans on price dis-
crimination. Other cases have been put forward by Holmes (1989) and Thisse and Vives (1988).
The intuition behind the fact that ﬁrms cannot obtain positive proﬁts when they price discriminate
across segments is that such pricing policy allows sellers to treat the distinct consumer segments
as completely separate markets. In such a case, a ﬁrm’s problem is separable in markets and, for
example, a natural extension of Theorem 1 can be supported as symmetric equilibrium.
5 Conclusions
We have examined a strategic game of targeted advertising and pricing between sellers of homo-
geneous products that operate in a market with various consumer segments. We have seen that if
t h em a r k e tw e r en o ts e g m e n t e d ,o ri fﬁrms were unable to target their ads on particular consumer
groups, competition would drive ﬁrm proﬁts down to zero; by contrast, when ﬁrms can use targeted
advertising and the distinct market segments diﬀer suﬃciently in terms of their proﬁtability, ﬁrms
obtain positive proﬁts in equilibrium. This has illustrated the idea that segmentation mitigates
market competitiveness provided that ﬁrms have advertising technologies that allow for the tar-
geting of ads at their disposal. Firms equilibrium strategies involve random pricing and random
24advertising and have the property that ﬁrm aggressiveness in a given market segment is inversely
related to the relative proﬁtability of the segment in question. As a result, ﬁrms advertise low
prices in the most proﬁtable segment, high prices in the least proﬁtable segment and intermediate
prices in the entire market. This implies that neither high nor low prices are heavily advertised but
intermediate ones.
These results have been derived in a model where consumer segmentation is ‘perfect’ in the sense
that the distinct buyer segments do not overlap; however, the features of this equilibrium prove
to be robust to ‘imperfect’ consumer segmentation. More interestingly, we have seen that ﬁrms
m a yo b t a i nh i g h e rp r o ﬁts when segmentation becomes more imperfect. We have also explored the
implications of entry of ﬁrms and the analysis has revealed that ﬁrms’ proﬁts fall as the market
hosts more sellers. Finally, we have examined the role that price discrimination would have in our
model and we have found that ﬁrms would beneﬁt from restrictions on price discrimination when
they engage in advertising and pricing competition in segmented markets.
All these results have been obtained in a model where ﬁrms sell homogeneous products, and, to
make it tractable, where advertising reaches all consumers and buyers do not search. However, the
idea that targeted advertising may weaken market competitiveness should easily extend to the case
of imperfect advertising technologies, consumer search, and product diﬀerentiation.
The results of this paper have been derived in a market with only two consumers segments. Cer-
tainly, markets are often comprised by a larger number of consumer segments, say m.Af a s c i n a t i n g
question is then whether a market with m+1consumer segments is more or less competitive than
am a r k e tw i t hm segments. Unfortunately, the game examined above becomes non-tractable when
there are m s e g m e n t si nt h ec o n s u m e rp o p u l a t i o ns ow eh a v eb e e nu n a b l et oa n s w e rt h i sq u e s t i o n
in general. The problem is that there are 2m+1 − 1 possible advertising strategies that must be
considered. Perhaps numerical methods can help tackle this problem in general; this is left open
for further research.
256 Appendix
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 :It is easy to see that pure advertising-strategy proﬁles cannot be part of
an equilibrium. As a consequence, ﬁrms must randomize between staying out of the market and
advertising in the entire market, i.e., λO + λM =1 ,λ j ∈ (0,1),j= O,M. Let us denote ﬁrm




R(p)[λO + λM (1 − FM (p))] − φA − φB =0for any p ∈ σM only if λO,λ M,F M(p) and σM take
the form speciﬁed in Theorem 1,i=1 ,2 . Moreover, it is readily seen that ﬁrms do not have an
incentive to deviate, that λj ∈ (0,1),j= O,M and that FM(p) is a well-behaved distribution
function deﬁn e do v e rt h es e tσM for any φj,µ j,j= A,B. This completes the proof. ¥
Proof of Lemma 1: It is obvious that any strategy proﬁle in which a ﬁrm (or both) stays
out of the market with probability one is not part of an equilibrium. We then concentrate on
advertising-strategy proﬁles where ﬁrms advertise in some market with strictly positive probability.
We start with symmetric pure strategy proﬁles. Suppose that both ﬁrms advertise in segment j
with probability one, j = A,B,M. If this were an equilibrium ﬁrms would advertise a price equal
to marginal cost; but in this case ﬁrms would not cover their advertising costs. Thus, this cannot
be part of an equilibrium.
We now rule out asymmetric pure advertising-strategy proﬁles. Suppose ﬁrms advertise in diﬀerent
segments, e.g., ﬁrm 1 advertises in segment A while ﬁrm 2 advertises in segment B. Then, ﬁrms
should charge pm, which would yield proﬁts π1 = µAR(pm) − φA and π2 = µBR(pm) − φB to the
ﬁrms. But if this were an equilibrium, a ﬁrm would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to deviate by advertising
a price slightly lower than the rival’s in its segment . Finally, assume that a ﬁrm, say ﬁrm 1,
advertises just in a single segment, say A, and the other ﬁrm goes for the entire market. Let
s1 = {λA =1 ,F A(p)} be ﬁrm 1’s strategy and let s2 = {λM =1 ,F M(p)} denote ﬁrm 2’s strategy.
If this were an equilibrium ﬁrms’ proﬁts would be given by:
Eπ1(λA =1 ,p;s2)=R(p)µA(1 − FM(p)) − φA
Eπ2(λM =1 ,p;s1)=R(p)[µA(1 − FA(p)) + µB] − φA − φB.
We note that it must be the case that pA < pM because otherwise ﬁrm 1 advertising the upper
26bound pA in A would make negative proﬁts. Since ﬁrm 2’s proﬁts must be constant for all prices in
σM, it follows that ﬁrm 2’s expected proﬁts must be Eπ2 = µBR(pM)−φA−φB. Now it is obvious
that ﬁrm 2 would gain by exiting segment A since the ﬁrm would save on advertising costs. The
other pure entry-strategy proﬁles are ruled out similarly. The proof is now complete. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :(a) We ﬁrst show that a symmetric positive-proﬁts equilibrium exists
only if λj ∈ (0,1) j = A,B,M. The result is proved by contradiction. Lemma 1 implies that
an equilibrium with positive proﬁts exists only if ﬁrms employ a random advertising-strategy.
It is obvious that any strategy proﬁle prescribing a ﬁrm to stay out of the market with positive
probability cannot yield positive proﬁts in equilibrium. Thus, we concentrate on mixed advertising-
strategy proﬁles where λO =0 . Suppose, ﬁrst, that ﬁrms randomize between advertising in segment
A and advertising in segment B,i.e., λA+λB =1 ,λ j > 0,j= A,B. Let us denote ﬁrms’ strategies as
si = {(λA,F A (p)),(λB,F B (p))},i=1 ,2. Given the rival’s strategy, ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ from advertising




= R(p)µA[λA(1 − FA(p)) + λB] − φA.
It is easy to see that the upper bound of FA(p) cannot be lower than pm because otherwise a
ﬁrm advertising the upper bound in A would gain by slightly raising its price, i.e., pA = pm. For
analogous reasons, it must be the case that pB = pm. This implies that if this were an equilibrium
then Eπi
¡
λA =1 ,p m;s−i¢
= Eπi
¡
λB =1 ,p m;s−i¢
> 0. But then a ﬁr mw o u l dg a i nb yd e v i a t i n g
and advertising pm in the entire market; indeed, deviating proﬁts would be Eπd
i
¡




λB =1 ,p m;s−i¢
+ Eπi
¡
λA =1 ,p m;s−i¢
.
Second, suppose that λA + λM =1 ,λ j > 0,j = A,M. Let’s denote ﬁrm i’s strategy as si =
{(λA,F A (p)),(λM,F M (p))},i=1 ,2. Taking as given the rival’s strategy, the proﬁtt oﬁrm i from




= R(p)µA[λA(1 − FA (p)) + λM(1 − FM (p))] − φA.




= λAR(p)µB + λAµAR(p)(1 − FA (p)) + λMR(p)(1 − FM (p)) − φA − φB.
As above we observe that FA (p) and FM (p) cannot have atoms. We now note that pA < pM;
indeed if pA ≥ pM a ﬁrm setting the upper bound pA in segment A would always obtain negative
proﬁts. Observe next that it must be the case that pM = pm; this is because there is a strictly
positive probability that a ﬁrm that advertises in the entire market is the only ﬁrm that is active in
segment B; then, a ﬁrm advertising a diﬀerent upper bound would gain by raising its price. Firms
must be indiﬀerent between the distinct price and advertising strategies; therefore equilibrium
proﬁts would be: Eπi
¡
λM =1 ,p m;s−i¢
= λAR(pm)µB − φA − φB. We now note that a ﬁrm can




λB =1 ,p m;s−i¢
= λAR(pm)µB − φB, which are clearly greater than equilibrium proﬁts for
all φA > 0. The case in which λB + λM =1 ,λ j ∈ (0,1) j = B,M is ruled out similarly.
(b) We now prove that a symmetric positive-proﬁts equilibrium exists only if FA (p),F B (p) and
FM (p) are atomless. Let si = {(λA,F A (p)),(λB,F B (p)),(λM,F M (p))},i=1 ,2 denote ﬁrms’



















By inspection of the proﬁts expression above it is easy to see that atoms can be proﬁtably undercut.
Hence, the proof follows.
(c) Finally, we prove that a symmetric equilibrium exists only if pA <p M = pA <p B < pM = pB =
pm. The proof follows from a series of seven claims.
Claim 1: If a positive-proﬁts equilibrium exists, @p ∈ σA ∩ σB.
Proof. We show this by contradiction. Suppose there existed a price common to σA and σB. Then
if a ﬁrm were indiﬀerent between advertising such a price in segment A a n di ns e g m e n tB, and
28that price yielded positive proﬁts, the ﬁrm would gain by deviating and advertising it in the entire
market, which yields a contradiction. ¥
Claim 2: If a positive-proﬁts equilibrium exists, pA <p B.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that pA >p B (the case pA = pB is ruled out by Claim 1). In
equilibrium the expected proﬁtt oaﬁrm advertising pB in segment B is Eπi(λB =1 ,p B;s−i)=
R(pB)µB[λA+λB+λM(1−FM(pB))]−φB. H o w e v e rn o t et h a ti faﬁrm advertises the same price pB in
segment A the expected proﬁti sEπi(λA =1 ,p B;s−i)=R(pB)µA[λA+λB+λM(1−FM(pB))]−φA.
Since φA/µA ≤ φB/µB then Eπi(λA =1 ,p B;s−i) ≥ Eπi(λB =1 ,p B;s−i) > 0. As a result, a ﬁrm
setting pB in segment B would gain by deviating and advertising pB in the entire market. ¥
Claim 3: If a positive-proﬁts equilibrium exists, pM ≤ pA.
Proof. Suppose not and pM > pA. Then a ﬁrm advertising pA in segment A would gain by slightly
increasing its price.
Claim 4: If a positive-proﬁts equilibrium exists, pM >p B.
Proof. Suppose, on the contrary, that pM ≤ pB. Consider ﬁrst that pM <p B. We have two
possibilities. One, pA ≤ pM <p B; in this case, a ﬁrm advertising pM in the entire market would
strictly gain by increasing the price until pB. Two, pM < pA <p B; if this is the case then a
ﬁrm advertising pA in A would gain by raising its price until pm, which contradicts Claim 1. It
remains to prove that pM = pB cannot be part of an equilibrium. We start noting that it must
be the case that pM = pB > pA. T os e et h i sn o t et h a ti fpM = pB ≤ pA then a ﬁrm advertising
pA in segment A would gain by raising its price. Further, given pM = pB > pA it follows that







, which is satisﬁed if and only if
λBµAR(pM)−φA =0 . However we note that if a ﬁrm deviates by advertising p = pm > pM in the
entire market, this ﬁrm will obtain proﬁts equal to Eπd
i
¡
λM =1 ,p m;s−i¢
= λAµBR(pm) − φB +
λBµAR(pm) − φA >λ AµBR(pm) − φB. ¥
Claim 5: If a positive-proﬁts equilibrium exists, pM = pB = pm.
Proof. We prove this by contradiction. First, suppose that pB < pM. The support conﬁguration
would then be pM ≤ pA <p B < pB < pM = pm, where pM = pm because otherwise a ﬁrm entering
29t h ee n t i r em a r k e ta n dc h a r g i n gpM would gain by increasing its price. A ﬁrm must be indiﬀerent






λM =1 ,p m;s−i¢








, for all p ∈ [pB,p m]. (6)
Moreover, a ﬁrm must be indiﬀerent between charging any price p ∈ [pB,pB] in segment B or in the
















for all p ∈ [pB,pB] (7)
The price distributions (6) and (7) must be equal at p = pB. Imposing this condition we obtain:
R(pB)=




A ﬁrm must be indiﬀerent between entering segment B and setting a price p ∈ σB and entering





λM =1 ,p m;s−i¢
.U s i n g( 7 ) ,













We can now determine the lowerbound of σB by solving FB(pB)=0in (8):
R(pB)=




Since pB must be positive in equilibrium, it must be the case that (λAµB + λBµA)R(pm)−
φA
µA > 0.
Since pB must also be positive, this implies that λA−λB > 0. Now we can compare pB and pm. For
pB <p m t oh o l d ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tλBµAR(pm)−φA < 0; b u tt h i si m p l i e st h a taﬁrm charging
pm in the entire market, which makes a proﬁte q u a lt oλAµBR(pm)−λBµAR(pm)−φA−φB, would
gain by entering only segment B. This constitutes a contradiction and proves that pB ≥ pM.
30It remains to prove that pB > pM cannot be part of an equilibrium. If this were so, then pB = pm,
and therefore the support conﬁguration would be pM ≤ pA <p B < pM < pB = pm. Moreover,
in equilibrium Eπi
¡
λB =1 ,p m;s−i¢
= λAµBR(pm) − φB. We know that a ﬁrm which deviates by
entering the entire market and charging pm would obtain a proﬁte q u a lt oEπd
i
¡




λB =1 ,p m;s−i¢
+ λBµAR(pm) − φA. For this deviation not to be proﬁtable, it must be the
case that λBµAR(pm) − φA ≤ 0. Further, in equilibrium a ﬁrm entering segment B must be indif-

















λM . The condition FM (pM)=1yields λBµAR(pM) − φA =0 , which
contradicts the condition above that λBµAR(pm)−φA ≤ 0. Therefore, if an equilibrium exists, then
pB = pM, and by the usual arguments pB = pM = pm. ¥
Claim 6: If a positive-proﬁts equilibrium exists, pA <p M.
Proof. Let us assume that pA ≥ pM, i.e., pM ≤ pA < pA <p B < pB = pM = pm. In equilibrium,






. This holds if and only if
R(p)µB[λA + λB + λM(1 − FM(p))] − φB =0 .




Further, in equilibrium Eπi
¡
λA =1 ,p;s−i¢
= λAµBR(pm)−φB. Using FM (p), this equality leads
to an expression for the prices charged in segment A: FA (p)=
φB−λAµ2
BR(pm)−φAµB
λAµAµBR(p) . Since FA (p) >
0 for all p ∈ σA, i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a tφB −λAµ2
BR(pm)−φAµB > 0. But then FA (p) would be
strictly decreasing in p, which cannot happen in equilibrium. ¥
Claim 7: If a positive-proﬁts equilibrium exists, pM = pA.
Proof. The proof of this result is analogous to the proof of Claim 6 and therefore omitted. ¥
This completes the proof of Proposition 1. ¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 : Let si = {(λj,F j (p))}j∈{A,B,M} , where λj,F j(p) and σj,j= A,B,M
are given in Theorem 2. It is easy to check that the equilibrium conditions Eπi(λj =1 ,p;s−i)=
λAµBR(pm)−φB for any p ∈ σj, are satisﬁed if and only if λj,F j(p) and σj,j= A,B,M take the
form presented in the Theorem.
31To prove that the strategies given in Theorem 2 constitute indeed an equilibrium and to prove
e x i s t e n c ew en e e dt os h o w(i) that ﬁrms do not have an incentive to deviate from the strategies
prescribed and (ii) that λA,λ B,λ M ∈ (0,1), λA +λB +λM =1 , the lower and upper bounds of the
supports of the price distributions satisfy the inequality given in Proposition 1, price distributions
are well-behaved and expected proﬁts are strictly positive if µA,µ B,φ A and φB satisfy the condition
g i v e ni nt h eT h e o r e m .
We start showing that ﬁrms cannot proﬁtably deviate. We note that there are various ways in
which a ﬁrm can deviate. A ﬁrm may deviate by advertising a price pd / ∈ σj in segment j. We
now prove that this cannot constitute a proﬁtable deviation. Take as given rival’s strategy and let
ﬁrm i deviate by advertising a price pd / ∈ σA in segment A. We have two possibilities. One, let
pd ∈ (pA,p B], then using (3), the expected proﬁtt oﬁrm i is Eπi
¡





) − φA. Using the expression for FM(p) when p ∈ (pA,p B],w en o t et h a t
Eπi
¡





−φA (1 − µA), which is strictly decreasing in pd.
Therefore, this deviation is not proﬁtable. Two, let pd ∈ σB; then using (3) and the expression for
FM(p) when p ∈ σB leads to Eπi
¡
λA =1 ,p d;s−i¢
=0 . Thus, ﬁrm i cannot increase its proﬁts by
advertising a price pd / ∈ σA in segment A. Second, let ﬁrm i deviate by advertising a price pd / ∈ σB
in segment B; again, we have two possibilities. One, let pd ∈ σA; then, using (4), we observe that
Eπi
¡
λB =1 ,p d;s−i¢
= µBR(pd) − φB. Since this expression is strictly increasing in pd, ﬁrm i will
set pd = pA = R−1(φB/µB); however this yields zero proﬁts. Thus, this deviation is not proﬁtable.
Two, let pd ∈ [pA,p B), then using (4) and the expression for FM(p) when p ∈ [pA,p B), the expected
proﬁtt oﬁrm i is Eπi
¡
λB =1 ,p d;s−i¢
= λAµBµAR(pd)+λAµBR(pm)+φAµB − φB. Since this
expression is strictly increasing in pd, ﬁrm i does not deviate. Third, suppose ﬁrm i deviates by
advertising a price pd / ∈ σM in the entire market. Then pd ∈ [pA,pA). Using (5), the proﬁtt oﬁrm i
is Eπi
¡





the expression for FA (p) obtained above this proﬁt can be rewritten as Eπi
¡
λM =1 ,p d;s−i¢
=
µBR(pd)+( 1− λA)µAR(pA) − φA − φB, which is strictly increasing in pd. Hence, this deviation
is not proﬁtable. We now observe that a ﬁrm may also deviate by advertising a price pd ∈ σj in
segment j0 6= j. This type of deviation is however ruled out by the cases above where a ﬁrm charges
ap r i c epd / ∈ σj0 in j0. Finally, a ﬁrm may also deviate by advertising a price pd / ∈ σj in j0 6= j, but
32these deviations are also ruled out by the previous arguments. This completes the proof of (i).
We now show (ii). We start noting that λA > 0 since φB/µB ≥ φA/µA >φ A. Moreover, λA < 1 if
and only if φA/µA > (φB/µB −R(pm))/µA, which is always satisﬁed because φB/µB −R(pm) < 0.




(µBR(pm)(µB − µA)+φBµA) <µ BR(pm)(µBR(pm) − φB). (9)



















which is the condition in the Theorem. We now note that pA <p M because λA > 0. Further,











We now show that if condition (11) holds, then (10) and (12) also hold. We prove this by showing



























µBR(pm)(µB − µA)+φBµA <µ 2
BR(pm)
−µA(µBR(pm) − φB) < 0.






−µBR(pm)φB(1 − µA) − φ2
BµA < 0.
It remains to show that the price distributions are increasing in p. This is readily seen for FA(p)





µB (µBR(pm) − φB). Proposition 1 implies that this is
the unique positive-proﬁts equilibrium. This completes the proof of Theorem 2. ¥
For later reference, let assume, without loss of generality, that φA = γR(pm), with γ ∈ (0,µ A) and
φB = βφA, with β ∈ [µB/µA,µ B/γ). We note that the existence condition for the positive-proﬁts
equilibrium can be rewritten as γ<µ B(µAβ − µB)/β2µA.
Proof of Proposition 2: Given that the σA,σB and σM must satisfy Proposition 1, we only
need to show that FM(p) >F B(p) for all p ∈ σB. Using the expressions above, it suﬃces to show
that λA(1 − λA) >λ B. Using the formulas for λA and λB given in Theorem 2, one gets that













or γ (γµA + µB)
µ2
B(1 + β)+β2γµA − βµB ¡
µ2
B + βγ − βγµB
¢2 µA
> 0.












34which is always satisﬁed when the condition in Theorem 2 holds. ¥






2 which is strictly positive given the equi-
librium condition. Second, ∂λB
∂γ =
γ
µA > 0; as a consequence ∂λM
∂γ < 0. Third, we claim that an










Since an increase in γ raises λB
λA, it follows that
∂R(p
B)
∂γ < 0; thus the claim follows. Fourth,












∂γ > 0; since ∂λA
∂γ > 0 this is al-





µB > 0. Sixth, equi-






∂γ − β) and using the expression for ∂λA
∂γ derived above, we note that ∂Eπ
∂γ > 0 if
and only if µ3
B(β−µB)−β(µ2
B+µAβγ)2 > 0; otherwise ∂Eπ
∂γ < 0. It is readily seen that the expression
µ3
B(β−µB)−β(µ2
B+µAβγ)2 is decreasing in γ and strictly positive for γ =0 . Moreover, the expres-
sion µ3
B(β−µB)−β(µ2
B+µAβγ)2 is negative for γ =
µB(βµA−µB)
β2µA
whenever (β−µB)(µB−βµA) < 0,
which is always satisﬁed in equilibrium. Finally, we note that as γ → 0,λ A and λB converge to
zero which implies that λM → 1. In addition pM goes to zero and FM(p) → 1. This completes the





2 , which is strictly positive. Second,
∂λB
∂β =0 . These two points imply that ∂λM








∂β =0 , it follows that an increase in β narrows σB, i.e.,
∂R(p
B)
∂β > 0. Fourth, like in (1), since
∂λA





µB > 0. Finally, ∂Eπ
∂β = R(pm)(∂λA
∂β µB−γ); using the expression for ∂λA
∂β derived above
we obtain that ∂Eπ
∂β > 0 if and only if µ2
B(µB +µAγ)−(µ2
B + βγµA)2 > 0, otherwise it is negative.
Let ψ(γ)=µ2
B(µB +µAγ)−(µ2




A < 0;t o
see this note that in equilibrium λA < 1 if and only if γ<µ B/(β −1), and since γ must be strictly
positive in equilibrium it follows that β>1. Further, we observe that ψ(γ) > 0 for β<2µB/µA; if
instead β>2µB/µA then ψ(γ) > 0 for γ =0and negative for γ = µB(βµA−µB)/β2µA. This com-
petes the proof of point (2) of the Proposition. We conclude with (3). First, we claim that ∂λA
∂µB < 0.





2 < 0 if and only if βγ(β − 1) − µB (2β − µB) < 0; this
condition is satisﬁed if and only if γ<
µB(2β−µB)
β(β−1) , which holds given the existence condition in The-
orem 2; hence, the claim follows. Second, ∂λB
∂µB =
γ







∂µB < 0 and ∂λB
∂µB > 0, it follows that an increase in µB widens σB, i.e.,
∂R(p
B)
∂µB < 0. Fourth, since
35∂λA
∂µB < 0, an increase in µB narrows σA.F i f t h ,s i n c e R(pM)=
βγR(pm)
µB an increase in µB widens
σM. Finally, ∂Eπ
∂µB = R(pm)(∂λA
∂µBµB − λA); using the expression for ∂λA
∂µB derived above and the ex-
pression for λA we obtain that ∂Eπ
∂β > 0 if and only if γ(β −µB)−µB(µB +γµA) > 0; otherwise it
is negative. Let ψ(γ)=γ(β − µB) − µB(µB + γµA). We observe that
∂ψ
∂γ = β − µB − µBµA > 0 if
and only if β>µ B(1 + µA); since in equilibrium β>1, this condition is always satisﬁed. Further,
ψ(γ =0 )=−µ2
B < 0. Furthermore we observe that when ψ(γ = µB(βµA − µB)/β2µA) > 0 if and
only if β>µ B(1 + µA)/µ2
A; otherwise it is negative. This competes the proof of point (3) of the
Proposition. The proof is now complete. ¥
Proof of Theorem 3: Let λj ∈ (0,1),j∈ {A,B,M} and λO ∈ [0,1) and let pA < pA =
pB = pM < pB = pM = pm. We ﬁrst note that since pm ∈ σB = σM in equilibrium a ﬁrm must
be indiﬀerent between advertising pm in segment B or advertising the same price in the entire
market, i.e., Eπi(λB =1 ,p m;s−i)=Eπi(λM =1 ,p m;s−i)=0 . Solving these two conditions
we obtain λO + λA = φB/µBR(pm) and λO + λB = φA/µAR(pm). Similarly, since pA ∈ σj,
j = A,B,M, in equilibrium it must be the case that Eπi(λj =1 ,pA;s−i)=0 , for any j = A,B,M.
Solving these conditions we obtain the frequency with which a ﬁrm advertises in segment A, λA =




BµA − µBR(pm)(φBµA − φAµB)
φBµBµAR(pm)
and λB =
(φBµA − φAµB)(µBR(pm) − φB)
φBµAµBR(pm)
and λM simply follows from λM =1 −λO−λA−λB. Second, the expected proﬁtt oaﬁrm advertising
ap r i c ep ∈ σB = σM in segment B is Eπi(λB =1 ,p;s−i)=R(p)µB[λO + λA + λB(1 − FB(p)) +
λM(1−FM(p))]−φB; similarly the expected proﬁtt oaﬁrm advertising the same price in the entire
market is Eπi(λM =1 ,p;s−i)=Eπi(λB =1 ,p;s−i)+R(p)µA[λO +λB +λM(1−FM(p))]−φA. In





R(p) . Third, for any price p ∈ σA it must be the case
that Eπi(λA =1 ,p;s−i)=R(p)µA[1−λA +λA(1−FA(p))]−φA =0 , which yields the equilibrium




R(p)µA − (1 − λA)
´
. Using this expression we can determine pA
by solving FA(pA)=0 , which yields pA = R−1(φA/µA).
36To prove that this characterization constitutes indeed an equilibrium and to prove existence we
need to show (i) that ﬁrms do not have an incentive to deviate from the strategies prescribed in
the Theorem; (ii) that the lower and upper bounds of the supports of the price distributions satisfy
pA < pA = pB = pM < pB = pM = pm and that price distributions are well-behaved; and (iii)t h a t
λj ∈ (0,1), j ∈ {A,B,M} and λO ∈ [0,1).
It is easy to check that (i) and (ii) are satisﬁed. We now prove (iii). First, it is readily seen that
λA,λ B,λ M ∈ (0,1) and λO < 1; moreover, inspection of the expression for λO reveals that λO ≥ 0
if and only if φA/µA ≥ (φB/µB)(1−φB/R(pm)µB). This completes the proof of the Theorem 2. ¥
Proof of Proposition 4: Firms’ payoﬀs from the diﬀerent advertising and pricing strategies are
given by:
Eπi(λA =1 ,p∈ σA;s−i)=R(p)(µA + µAB)[λA(1 − FA(p)) + λB + λM] − φA (13)
Eπi(λB =1 ,p∈ σB;s−i)=R(p)[µBλA + λB(µB + µAB)(1 − FB(p)) (14)
+λM(µB + µAB)(1 − FM(p))] − φB
Eπi(λM =1 ,p∈ σM ∩ σB;s−i)=R(p)[µBλA + λB[µA +( µB + µAB)(1 − FB(p))] (15)
+λM(1 − FM(p))] − φA − φB
Consider the strategy proﬁle speciﬁed in Proposition 4. We note that this is the unique strategy
proﬁle that satisﬁes the conditions given in Proposition 1. To prove that these strategies constitute
a positive-proﬁt se q u i l i b r i u ma n dt op r o v ee x i s t e n c ew ep r o c e e da si nt h ep r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 .
We start showing that ﬁrms cannot proﬁtably deviate. Assume, without loss of generality, that
ﬁrm 2 follows the strategy prescribed in the Proposition. Consider that ﬁrm 1 deviates by adver-
t i s i n gap r i c epd / ∈ σA in segment A. Assume ﬁrst pd ∈ (pA,p B], then Eπd
1
¡
λA =1 ,p d;s2¢
=
λB (1 − µB)R(pd)+λM (1 − µB)R(pd)(1 − FM
¡
pd¢
) − φA. Using the expression for FM (p) in
the Proposition yields Eπd
1
¡
λA =1 ,p d;s2¢




− φAµB,w h i c hi s
strictly decreasing in pd. Therefore this deviation is not proﬁtable. Suppose now that pd ∈
σB; then deviating proﬁts are Eπd
1
¡
λA =1 ,p d;s2¢




37λM (1 − µB)R(pd)(1−FM
¡
pd¢
)−φA. Using the expressions for FB (p) and FM (p) in the Proposi-
tion we obtain Eπd
1
¡







. This proﬁt is decreasing in pd
and therefore the most proﬁtable deviation consists of setting pd = pB. However, we have shown
above that a ﬁrm advertising pB in segment A gets lower proﬁts than in equilibrium. In summary,
a ﬁrm that advertises in segment A does not gain by charging a price pd / ∈ σA.
Second, consider that ﬁrm 1 deviates by advertising pd / ∈ σB in segment B Consider ﬁrst that
pd ∈ [pA,p B); then deviating proﬁts are Eπd
1
¡
λB =1 ,p d;s2¢
= λAµBR(pd)+λB (1 − µA)R(pd)+
λM (1 − µA)R(pd)(1−FM
¡
pd¢




λB =1 ,p d;s2¢
= λAµB (1 − µA)R(pm)+λAµBµAR(pd)+φA (1 − µA)−φB, which is strictly








)+(1− λA)(1− µA)R(pd)−φB. Using
the expression for FA (p) in the Proposition we obtain Eπd
1
¡
λB =1 ,p d;s2¢
= µAB (1 − λA)R(pA)+
µBR(pd)−φB. Since this expression is strictly increasing in pd, the most proﬁtable deviation consists
of setting pd = pA, which is not proﬁtable. Thus, ﬁrm 1 advertising in segment B does not gain by
charging a price pd / ∈ σB.
Finally, consider that ﬁrm 1 deviates by advertising a price pd / ∈ σM in the entire market, i.e.,
pd ∈ [pA,pA). The deviating proﬁti sEπd
1
¡
λM =1 ,p d;s2¢




)+(1 − λA)R(pd)−φA−φB. Using the expression for FA (p) above, we obtain Eπd
1
¡
λM =1 ,p d;s2¢
=
(1 − µB)(1− λA)R(pA)+R(pd)µB − φA − φB, which is strictly increasing in pd. Thus ﬁrm 1 ad-
vertising in the entire market does not gain by charging a price pd / ∈ σM.
We now show λj ∈ (0,1),λ A + λB + λM =1 ,j∈ {A,B,M}. The same arguments as those in the
proof of Theorem 2 show that λA ∈ (0,1) and λB ∈ (0,1). It is easy to see that λM =1−λA −λB.
We note that λM > 0 if and only if
φA
µA
(µBR(pm)(µB − µA)+φB(1 − µB)) <µ BR(pm)(µBR(pm) − φB). (16)





µBR(pm)(µB − µA)+φB(1 − µB)
. (17)














Note that pA > 0 trivially holds and pM > 0 if λAµBR(pm)−φB > 0, which holds whenever (18) is
satisﬁed. Further, pA <p M because λA > 0. Furthermore, pM <p B if and only if (1−λA)(λAµB −





µB(µBR(pm) − φB)+φB(1 − µA)
. (19)
Finally, we note that if (19) holds, then pB > 0. We now show that if condition (19) holds, then
(17) and (18) also hold. We prove this by showing that the RHS of (19) is lower than the RHS of
the other conditions. Consider ﬁrst (17). We need to show that
φB(µBR(pm) − φB)
µB(µBR(pm) − φB)+φB(1 − µA)
>
µBR(pm)(µBR(pm) − φB)
µBR(pm)(µB − µA)+φB(1 − µB)
φB
µB(µBR(pm) − φB)+φB(1 − µA)
<
µBR(pm)
µBR(pm)(µB − µA)+φB(1 − µB)
Since φB <µ BR(pm), it is suﬃc i e n tt os h o wt h a tt h ed e n o m i n a t o ro ft h eL H Si sl a r g e rt h a nt h e
denominator of the RHS:
µB(µBR(pm) − φB)+φB(1 − µA) >µ BR(pm)(µB − µA)+φB(1 − µB)
φB(1 − µA − µB − 1+µB) >µ BR(pm)(µB − µA − µB)
−µAφB > −µAµBR(pm)
φB <µ BR(pm)
which holds always. Second, consider (18); it must be the case that
φB(µBR(pm) − φB)




















39Using the fact that 1 − µB = µA + µAB, this inequality can be rewritten as follows:
µAµ2
BR(pm) < (µA + µAB)µB(µBR(pm) − φB)+φB(1 − µB)(1 − µA)
0 < −µAµBφB + µABµB(µBR(pm) − φB)+φB(1 − µB)(1 − µA)
0 <µ AB(φB + µB(µBR(pm) − φB))
which is always satisﬁe d .W en o t et h a tw h e nµAB =0 , these two conditions are identical.
It remains to show that the price distributions are increasing in p. This is readily seen for FA(p)
and FM(p); for FB(p), this follows from the fact that λAµB − λB(1 − µA) > 0, as shown above.
This completes the proof of Proposition 4. ¥






µAR(pm). Let, as above, φA = γR(pm) and φB = βφA with γ ∈ (0,µ A) and β ∈ [µB/µA,µ B/γ).
First, keeping µB constant, λA does not depend on µAB and therefore ∂λA
∂µAB =0 . Second, an increase
in µAB lowers µA and therefore ∂λB
∂µAB > 0. From these observations, it follows that ∂λM





1−λA;s i n c e ∂λA
∂µAB =0it follows that
∂(R(pA)/R(p
A))
∂µAB =0 . Thus, an increase








∂µAB > 0, it follows that an increase in µAB lowers pB and therefore widens σB.
Fifth, since pM =
λAµBR(pm)+φA−φB
(1−λA)(1−µB) does not depend on µAB, it follows that an increase in µAB
leaves σM unaltered. Finally, we note that equilibrium expected proﬁti sEπ1
¡
λB =1 ,p m;s2¢
=
λAµBR(pm) − φA which does not depend on µAB and µB is kept constant. We now turn to part






2 . Inspection of this equation reveals that
∂λA
∂µAB > 0 if γ<
µB(2β−µB)
β(β−1) . We now show that this last inequality holds in equilibrium. Indeed,
λA < 1 if and only if γ<
µB









β(β−1) whenever β − µB > 0 which is always satisﬁed in equilibrium.
Thus, ∂λA
∂µAB > 0. Second, since µA is constant, λB does not depend on µAB and therefore ∂λB
∂µAB =0 .
As a consequence ∂λM


















∂µAB (1 − µB)(µBR(pm)+φA − φB) − (1 − λA)(λAR(pm)+φA − φB)
(1 − λA)
2 (1 − µB)
2
Inspection of this derivative reveals that ∂R(pM)/∂µAB > 0 i fa n do n l yi fi t sn u m e r a t o ri sp o s i t i v e .
Using the expressions for ∂λA
∂µAB and λA we obtain that the condition above is satisﬁed if and only
if (µB − γ (β − 1))2 (1 − µB) > 0, which is always satisﬁed. Thus, an increase in µAB narrows σM.














Using the expressions for ∂λA




λB (1 − µA)(γ
¡








We now prove that 2µB − β − µ2
B ≤ 0. Suppose, on the contrary, that 2µB − β − µ2
B > 0 or
β<µ B (2 − µB); since in equilibrium λA < 1 if and only if γ<
µB
β−1 and β>1, we must
require that µB (2 − µB) > 1, which is never satisﬁed. As a consequence
∂R(p
B)




β−µB(2−µB) = γ, otherwise
∂R(p
B)
∂µAB < 0. Finally, we observe that ﬁrm equilibrium proﬁts change








. Using the previous arguments,
it follows that
∂Eπi(λB=1,pm;s−i)
∂µAB ≥ 0 if and only if γ ≤ γ. We note that the region of parameters for
which γ ≤ γ and the positive-proﬁts equilibrium exists is not empty. The proof is now complete.
¥
Proof of Proposition 7:W eﬁrst prove that ﬁrms cannot obtain positive proﬁts in equilibrium.
The proof borrows from some of the results above. In particular, it is readily seen that Lemma 1
also holds if ﬁrms can practise price discrimination; moreover, a positive-proﬁts equilibrium where
λM =0does not exist (Proposition 1) when ﬁrms can practise price discrimination. We now
prove that λA + λM =1cannot be part of an equilibrium. Let us denote ﬁrm i’s strategy as
si = {(λA,F A(p)),(λM, e FA(p), e FB(p))}, σA,e σA and e σB be the supports of the price distributions,
and pA,e pA and e pB the upper bounds of the supports. We note that FA(p), e FA(p) and e FB(p) must
41be atomless. The proﬁts to a ﬁrm advertising in segment A would be:
Eπi
¡
λA =1 ,p∈ σA;s−i¢
= R(p)µA[λA(1 − FA (p)) + λM(1 − e FA (p))] − φA.
Likewise, the proﬁts to a ﬁrm advertising in the entire market would be:
Eπi
¡
λM =1 ,p A ∈ e σA,p B ∈ e σB;s−i¢
= λAR(pB)µB + λAµAR(pA)(1 − FA (pA)) +
λMµAR(pA)(1 − e FA (pA)) + λMµBR(pB)(1 − e FB (pB))
−φA − φB.
We note that pA < e pA otherwise a ﬁrm charging pA in A w o u l dm a k en e g a t i v ep r o ﬁts. This implies
that e pA = pm. It must also be the case that e pB = pm. Since pm ∈ e σA ∩ e σB, the proof now follows
that of Proposition 1. The case λB + λM =1is ruled out similarly.
It remains to prove that ﬁrms cannot make positive proﬁts when λj > 0,j = A,B,M. Let si =
{(λA,F A(p)),(λB,F B(p)),(λM, e FA(p), e FB(p))} denote ﬁrm i’s strategy, σA,σB,e σA and e σB be the
supports of the price distributions, and pA,pB,e pA and e pB the upper bounds of the supports. We
can write down the payoﬀ to a ﬁrm from the diﬀerent advertising strategies:
Eπi
¡
λA =1 ,p∈ σA;s−i¢
= R(p)µA[λA(1 − FA (p)) + λB + λM(1 − e FA (p))] − φA
Eπi
¡
λB =1 ,p∈ σB;s−i¢
= R(p)µB[λA + λB(1 − FB (p)) + λMp(1 − e FB (p))] − φB
Eπi
¡
λM =1 ,p A ∈ e σA,p B ∈ e σB;s−i¢
= Eπi
¡
λA =1 ,p A ∈ e σA;s−i¢
+ Eπi
¡
λB =1 ,p B ∈ e σB;s−i¢
We note ﬁrst that FA(p),F B(p), e FA(p) and e FB(p) must be atomless. We now note that σA ∩ e σA
cannot be empty. Otherwise, e.g. if pA < e pA a ﬁrm advertising pA in segment A would gain
by increasing its price; if, instead e pA <p A, a ﬁrm advertising e pA in segment A and pB ∈ e σB in
segment B a tt h es a m et i m ew o u l dg a i nb yi n c r e a s i n gt h ep r i c ea d v e r t i s e di ns e g m e n tA. The same
arguments imply that σB ∩ e σB cannot be empty. Now let p1 ∈ σA ∩ e σA and p2 ∈ σB ∩ e σB. Since
the ﬁrms must be indiﬀerent between advertising p1 in segment A, p2 in segment B and (p1,p 2) in
the entire market, this implies that ﬁrms proﬁts must be zero. This completes the proof that ﬁrms
cannot obtain positive proﬁts in equilibrium. The equilibrium characterization oﬀered in the result
42readily follows from an elaboration of Theorem 1. The proof of the other zero-proﬁts equilibria is
available from the authors upon request. ¥
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